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ADMISSION OF PRIOR BAD ACTS IN NEW
YORK FOR IMPEACHMENT PURPOSES: A
MOVEMENT WITH THE MAJORITY
Impeachment is the process by which a witness's veracity is
called into question for the purpose of showing that the witness
lacks credibility, and therefore, his testimony is not worthy of be-
lief.' There are several methods by which counsel may impeach
the credibility of a witness. 2 Although authorities and commenta-
tors categorize the methods of impeachment differently,3 a wit-
ness is usually impeached through prior inconsistent statements,4
1 See Steven Lubet, Understanding Impeachment, 15 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 483, 485
(1992). "[I]mpeachment is actually intended to discredit the witness as a reliable source of
information. Successful impeachment renders the witness less worthy of belief, as opposed
to merely showing him to be unobservant, mistaken, or otherwise subject to contradiction."
Id.; see also Gertz v. Fitchburg R.R., 137 Mass. 77, 78 (1884). An early rationale in support
of the rule of impeachment of a witness's credibility, was stated by Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes:
[W]hen it is proved that a witness has been convicted of a crime, the only ground for
disbelieving him which such proof affords is the general readiness to do evil which the
conviction may be supposed to show. It is from that general disposition alone that the
jury is asked to infer a readiness to lie in the particular case, and thence that he has
lied in fact. The evidence has no tendency to prove that he was mistaken, but only that
he has perjured himself, and it reaches that conclusion solely through the general
proposition that he is of bad character and unworthy of credit.
Id.; BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 753 (6th ed. 1990). The impeachment of a witness means to
"call in question the veracity of a witness, by means of evidence adduced for such purpose,
or the adducing of proof that a witness is unworthy of belief." Id.
2 See infra notes 3-6 and accompanying text (discussing methods by which witness may
be impeached); see also United States v. Zito, 467 F.2d 1401, 1404 (2d Cir. 1972) (impeach-
ing by implying witness had fabricated testimony to escape prosecution); Felice v. Long
Island R.R., 426 F.2d 192, 197-98 (2d Cir.) (impeaching by showing witness's failure to
state fact in accident report that he later testified to), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 820 (1970);
Ryan v. United Parcel Serv., 205 F.2d 362, 364 (2d Cir. 1953) (impeach by showing police
officer's testimony conflicted with that of defendant's employee thereby implying employee
altered his testimony); Affronti v. United States, 145 F.2d 3, 7-8 (8th Cir. 1944) (impeach-
ing through evidence of inconsistent statements at trial).
3 See EDWARD CLEARY, McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE § 33, at 111 (4th ed. 1992) (stating
there are five main modalities of attack upon credibility of witness, namely physical and
mental capacity, actuality of employment of such capacity to perceive, record and recollect,
and his ability to narrate); Lubet, supra note 1, at 485. "There are three basic categories of
witness impeachment . .. prior inconsistent statements, character and 'case data.'" Id.
"[Clase data" includes bias, prejudice, personal interest, and motive. Id.; H. Richard Uvil-
ler, Credence, Character, and the Rules of Evidence: Seeing Through the Liar's Tale, 42
DuKE L.J. 776, 781 (1993). Impeachment methods fall into six categories: contradiction,
inconsistency, incoherence, bias, character, and demeanor. Id. at 781-87.
4 See WILLIAM P. RIcHARDsoN, RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE § 501, at 486 (10th ed. 1973 &
Supp. 1972-85). Testimony of a witness may be impeached by showing that the witness
has, at some other time, made a statement that is inconsistent with the testimony pres-
ently given. Id.; Michael H. Graham, Evidence and Trial Advocacy Workshop: Prior Incon-
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partiality,- and character.6
The use of character evidence to impeach credibility has proven
to be one of the more troublesome methods of impeachment.' The
character of a witness may be attacked through conviction of a
crime, past untruthfulness, and other prior bad acts.8 The extent
sistent Statements-Requirements for Impeachment, 21 CRiM. L. BULL. 156, 160 (Mar.-Apr.
1985). Impeachment of a witness through the use of prior inconsistent statements may be
implemented by proving: (1) that the witness made a statement outside of the courtroom
contradicting his in-court testimony; or (2) that the witness failed to speak under circum-
stances where it would have been natural for him to relate the matters testified to in court
to another outside of the courtroom if they are indeed true. Id.; Lubet, supra note 1, at 497.
A contradictory statement made by the witness outside the courtroom is the most dramatic
because it directly confronts the witness to be impeached with a previous inconsistent
statement tending to show that he has altered his original accounting of the events. Id.; see
also FED. R. EvID. 613. Rule 613 provides in relevant part:
(a) Examining witness concerning prior statement. In examining a witness concerning
a prior statement made by the witness, whether written or not, the statement need not
be shown nor its contents disclosed to the witness at that time, but on request the
same shall be shown or disclosed to opposing counsel.
(b) Extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement of witness. Extrinsic evidence of
a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible unless the witness is
afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same and the opposite party is afforded
an opportunity to interrogate the witness thereon, or the interests of justice otherwise
require. This provision does not apply to admissions of a party-opponent as defined in
rule 801(d)(2).
Id.
5 See Thomas Black, Witnesses Commentary, 30 Hous. L. REV. 673, 719 (1993). The most
effective mode of impeachment is showing the witness has made an inconsistent or contra-
dictory statement in the past. Id.; see also 1 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, MODERN STATE AND FED-
ERAL EVIDENCE-A COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE TExT 599 (1989). "Matters which may rea-
sonably be expected to color the testimony of a witness or cause him to testify falsely are
proper subjects of inquiry of any witness by any party." Id.; EUGENE J. KAPLAN, A LAw
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS GUIDE 39 (1979). "Even though personal interest no longer makes
a witness incompetent to testify, it can certainly damage his credibility in the eyes of the
jury." Id.; Evan Haglund, Impeaching the Underworld Informant, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1405,
1413 (1990). Because informants are often tempted to lie, possibly implicating innocent
persons, defendants should be given a greater opportunity to impeach them. Id.; Lubet,
supra note 1, at 538. A witness who has a personal interest in the outcome of a case may be
tempted to testify falsely. Id. at 535. Consciously or subconsciously, there is a tendency to
shape recollections in the direction of the preferred outcome. Id.
6 See Lubet, supra note 1, at 485. "Character impeachment .... refers to the use of some
inherent trait or particular characteristic of the witness, essentially unrelated to the case
at hand, to render the testimony less credible." Id.
7 See Uviller, supra note 3, at 789. "Of the several methods for the recognition of truth,
one of the most impressive and most troublesome is ... character." Id.; see also JACK B.
WEINSTEIN ET AL., EVIDENCE, CASES AND MATERIALS at xx (8th ed. 1990). Despite ten years
of experience with the Federal Rules of Evidence and a plethora of cases available constru-
ing evidentiary law, issues pertaining to credibility of witnesses, especially those dealing
with prior bad acts, remain difficult to interpret. Id.; Mark Voightmann, Note, The Short
History of a Rule of Evidence that Failed (Federal Rule of Evidence 609, Green v. Bock
Laundry Machine Co. and the New Amendment), 23 IND. L. REV. 927, 927 (1990). Impeach-
ment by character evidence has become one of most difficult and controversial forms of
impeachment. Id. Federal Rule of Evidence 609 presents treatment of only one character
issue, while Federal Rule of Evidence 404 tries to resolve the more difficult problem of
using character evidence for out of court actions. Id.
8 See Lubet, supra note 1, at 530. "The most common forms of character impeachment
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to which a witness's prior bad acts are admissible varies according
to the particular jurisdiction's rules of evidence. 9 The majority of
jurisdictions have codified their rules of evidence, and most have
modeled them after the Federal Rules of Evidence. 10 New York,
however, remains one of the few jurisdictions with rules of evi-
dence governed primarily by case law."
Where a prior bad act is at issue, the New York Court of Ap-
peals ruled, in the seminal case People v. Sorge, 2 that "a defend-
ant, like any other witness, may be interrogated upon cross-exam-
ination in regard to any vicious or criminal act of his life that has
a bearing on his credibility as a witness."' 3 Contrary to this ra-
tionale, Federal Rules of Evidence 609(a) and 608(b) require that
the prior bad act in question be either a crime for which the wit-
ness has been convicted, 14 or be probative of the truthfulness or
include conviction of a crime, defect in memory or perception, and past untruthfulness." Id.
Past untruthfulness is further explained along with the category "other bad acts." Id. at
532; see also CLEARY, supra note 3, §§ 40-43, at 137-60. Character impeachment may be
accomplished by showing: misconduct for which there has been no criminal conviction; con-
viction of crime; or proof of opinion or bad reputation. Id.; Black, supra note 5, at 719-20. A
witness may be impeached by demonstrating: past inconsistent statements; bias or pecuni-
ary interest in the case; ability to perceive; capacity to remember or recount; contradiction
through testimony of another witness; and attacking the witness's character by showing he
is generally unworthy of belief. Id.
9 See infra notes 13-16 and accompanying text (noting state applications of rules of evi-
dence based upon Federal Rules of Evidence, common law, or individual code).
10 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 733-804 (1988). The Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted into law
on July 1, 1975. Id. "Although a number of states still languish codeless, many have drafts
in the works-and soon (it is fair to predict), the evidentiary codification of the United
States will be virtually complete." See Uviller, supra note 3, at 794.
11 Barbara C. Salken, To Codify or Not to Codify-That is the Question: A Study of New
York's Efforts to Enact an Evidence Code, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 641, 642 n.2 (1992). The only
other jurisdictions that remain without codified rules of evidence are Connecticut, Illinois,
Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, and Virginia. Id. Of the remaining forty-three jurisdic-
tions, thirty-four enacted rules of evidence modeled after the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id.
"New York State's law of evidence continues to be governed largely by cases, despite codifi-
cation efforts dating back almost 150 years." Id. at 641.
12 301 N.Y. 198, 93 N.E.2d 637 (1950).
13 Id. at 200, 93 N.E.2d. at 638 (quoting People v. Webster, 139 N.Y. 73, 84, 34 N.E.2d
730, 733 (1893)).
14 FED. R. EVID. 609(a). Rule 609(a) provides that for purposes of attacking the credibil-
ity of a witness:
(1) evidence that a witness other than an accused has been convicted of a crime shall
be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or imprison-
ment in excess of one year under the law under which the witness was convicted, and
evidence that an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the
court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect to the accused; and
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it
involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
Id. Rule 609(aXl) requires the judge to permit impeachment of a civil witness with evi-
dence of a prior felony conviction, regardless of the prejudice to the witness. Id. When a
defendant takes the stand in a criminal case, his credibility may be impeached, and his
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untruthfulness of the witness. 15 Although New York courts con-
tinue to follow the rule promulgated in Sorge, more recent deci-
sions appear to be moving in the direction of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.' 6
Part One of this Note explores the impact of information regard-
ing a witness's prior bad acts on the jury. Part Two recounts the
history and philosophy of the modern impeachment process using
prior bad acts. Part Three examines Federal Rule of Evidence
608(b), which sets forth the federal standard for impeachment of a
witness based on prior bad acts. Part Three also focuses on Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 609(a), which sets forth the standard of ad-
missibility of prior bad acts for which a conviction has already
been obtained. Finally, Part Four reveals that based on an analy-
sis of New York case law commencing with Sorge, New York
courts are impliedly applying the Federal Rules of Evidence while
expressly stating otherwise. Part Four concludes with a determi-
nation of the extent to which the Proposed New York Rules of Evi-
dence are similar to the Federal Rules of Evidence.
I. THE IMPACT OF PRIOR BAD ACTS OF WITNESSES ON THE JURY
One of the many roles of the jury, as the finder of fact, is to
weigh the veracity of a witness.' 7 Doubtlessly, character evidence
testimony attacked in the same manner as any other defendant, including reference to
prior convictions. Id.
15 FED. R. EVID. 608(b). Rule 608(b) provides, in relevant part:
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for
the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness's credibility, other than for convic-
tion of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They
may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthful-
ness, be inquired into during cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning the wit-
ness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness
being cross-examined has testified.
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness, does not
operate as a waiver of the accused's or the witness's privilege against self-incrimina-
tion when examined with respect to matters which relate only to credibility.
Id. Rule 608(b) generally bars evidence of specific incidents as proof in chief of the charac-
ter of a witness for purposes of attacking or supporting his credibility. Id. However, these
incidents may be inquired into during cross-examination of the principal witness or of a
witness who testifies concerning the defendant's character for truthfulness. Id.
16 See infra notes 62-121 and accompanying text (discussing case law supporting use of
Federal Rules of Evidence).
17 See Uviller, supra note 3, at 776. "[Tlhe adversary trial might be fairly described as a
structured process for the determination of the credibility of strangers, many of whom will,
for one reason or another, try to deceive those who rely upon their word." Id. Underlying
the adversarial nature of our adjudication process is the premise that jurors possess the
ability to assess the testimony of witnesses and to conclude which of those witnesses are
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elicited on cross-examination effects the jury's verdict. 18 Federal
Rules of Evidence, therefore, accompanied with appropriate judi-
cial discretion, determine what information the jury will be given
in order to appraise a witness's credibility. 9
Jurisdictional rules vary regarding the degree and the nature of
previous bad acts that the jury will be permitted to hear about the
witness. 20 These variations reflect, in part, different beliefs con-
cerning the jury's ability to assess information about the witness,
and to apply the information according to the court's instruc-
tions. 21 Psychological studies concerning how people form impres-
not being forthright and which are telling the truth. Id.; see also KAPLAN, supra note 5, at
35. It is for the jury, as the fact-finder, to decide which witnesses are believable. Id.; MAR-
TIN F. KAPLAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM 172 (Norbert L. Kerr & Robert M.
Bray eds., 1982). One way to conceptualize the trial process is to view it as a test of credibil-
ity. Id. at 170. The two major dimensions of credibility are competence and trustworthi-
ness. Id. Competence is relevant where the intent to deceive is unlikely, whereas, trustwor-
thiness relates primarily to situations where it is more likely the witness is lying. Id. Other
dimensions of credibility which relate to competence and trustworthiness are: dynamics,
composure, and sociability. Id. These elements are relevant "if a witness lacks dynamism
and composure as exhibited by a barely audible voice.., and numerous nonverbal adapters
such as self touching and fidgeting with clothing, he or she is likely to be perceived as
relatively incompetent and/or untrustworthy." Id.; Yvette A. Beeman, Note, Accomplice
Testimony Under Contingent Plea Agreements, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 800, 820-21 (1987).
Although some accomplices to a crime will testify truthfully, others will elaborate testi-
mony to ensure reduced sentences. Id.
18 See SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND
TRIAL PROCEDURE 164 (1985) (discussing ability of jurors to detect inaccurate or deceptive
character testimony, impact of testimony on verdicts and means of modifying impact);
David P. Leonard, Appellate Review of Evidentiary Rulings, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1155, 1201
(1992) (stating that specific acts of character impeachment evidence may have pivotal im-
pact); Uviller, supra note 3, at 780 (overall courtroom setting does not provide particularly
useful arena for detection of truth).
19 See supra note 14 (discussing Federal Rule of Evidence 609). Rule 609 allows into
evidence a prior bad act which was a crime and resulted in a conviction for which a sen-
tence of death or imprisonment of greater than one year could have been imposed, provided
that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice. Id.; see also infra note 76 (discussing Federal Rule of Evidence 403). For
impeachment purposes, crimesmay either be felony grade, without particular regard to the
nature of the offense; or involve dishonesty and false statement. Id. Crimes involving dis-
honesty or false statements include perjury, false statement, criminal fraud, embezzle-
ment, or false pretense. Id. at 3, 7.
20 See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text (noting differences among individual
states' rules of evidence); see also CLEARY, supra note 3, § 41, at 138-39. The majority of
courts have adopted Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) which limits cross-examination of a
witness, regarding his own conduct, to such acts relating to his credibility as a witness. Id.
Some courts allow cross-examination as to any acts of misconduct, while other courts do not
permit any cross-examination regarding misconduct for the purpose of impeachment. Id.
21 See United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898,915 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
920 (1979). The Beechum court held that extrinsic evidence that closely resembled the
charged offense had a greater prejudicial effect. Id.; PAUL R. RICE, EVIDENCE: COMMON LAW
AND FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 696 (1987). Since information about previous convictions
and prior bad acts is only admissible to determine the credibility of the witness-defendant,
the jury must be able to comprehend this information when assessing the credibility of his
testimony. Id. Similarly, such information should not to be used to determine whether he
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sions of others confirm that character evidence offered against a
witness is extremely prejudicial.22 However, studies also reveal
that people generally behave in accordance with their individual
character traits, leading juries to infer that those with bad charac-
ters are not to be believed.23 The impact, therefore, of information
regarding a witness's prior bad acts on a jury can neither be ig-
nored nor underestimated.2 4
As a general rule, the common law prohibits evidence that the
act which defendant is accused of is characteristic of the defend-
ant's personality.25 An exception to the general rule is the process
of impeaching a witness's credibility with evidence of a character
trait.26 Furthermore, while evidence of a witness's prior bad acts
committed the crime for which he is being tried. Id.
22 See KASSIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 18, at 159. Information regarding specific acts
has a great impact upon the jury, even more so than general reputation testimony, since
such information is "more concrete, immediate, and vivid." Id.; see also KAPLAN, supra note
17, at 200. "Few would assert that a juror's mind is a tabula rosa." Id. "Jurors integrate
into their judgement elements aside from the implications of the evidence for the verdict."
Id. at 200-01; MARGARET C. ROBERTS, TRIAL PSYCHOLOGY: COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION
IN THE COURTROOM 113, 232 (1987). Jurors form impressions of the credibility of witnesses
by relying on dress and appearance, as well as facial and bodily expressions. Id. Specific
acts which are "more extreme in nature" may be carefully selected by a party and therefore
likely to carry more weight. Id. at 160. Furthermore, people tend to believe negative infor-
mation since "it is more unexpected and hence violates social norms." Id.
23 See Susan Marlene Davies, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: A Reassessment of
Relevancy, 27 CRIM. L. BULL. 504, 506 (1988). "The psychological studies of how people form
impressions of the personalities of others appeared to confirm the intuitive belief in the
highly prejudicial nature of character evidence that is reflected in the exclusionary rules.
Id. Individuals seem to have consistent behavioral tenancies in certain situations. Id. at
516. In view of this, trait theorists may accurately predict behavior. Id. Furthermore, "psy-
chologists now recognize that, as a general matter, a lay person, given information about a
subject's past behavior, can predict the subject's future behavior with a significant degree
of accuracy." Id. at 517; see also DWIGHT GAYLORD MCCARTY, PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAw 407
(1960). Although it was believed that juries were easily swayed, jurors are now viewed as
intelligent persons who realize when a trial lawyer is attempting to play on their emotions
or prejudices. Id. at 408 n.32 (citing Orin Bartlett, Gentlemen of the Jury, SATURDAY EvE-
NING POST, Dec. 5, 1925, at 12).
24 See KAPLAN, supra note 17, at 100. After reviewing research performed in the field,
the authors concluded that jurors were more likely to convict defendants of low moral char-
acter if their victims possessed high moral character. Id.
25 See RICE, supra note 21, at 696. The author explains:
[P]arties... cannot generally use character evidence to establish an individual's pro-
pensity from which the individual's conduct can be inferred. The reasons for this are
twofold. First, courts believe that character evidence has limited probative value. Sec-
ond, courts do not believe that the limited probative value of character evidence justi-
fies the risk that the jury will improperly use it.
Id.; see also United States v. Fernandez, 496 F.2d 1294, 1302 (5th Cir. 1974) (prosecuting
attorney improperly argued defendant's prior convictions evidenced his propensity to com-
mit present crime).
26 See RICE, supra note 21, at 626. A witness's credibility may be impeached with charac-
ter evidence or evidence of specific instances of conduct. Id. The justification for these ex-
ceptions include:
(1) that the focus of the character impeachment evidence is on the witness' present
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is generally not an acceptable means of examining a witness,
counsel may use evidence of prior bad acts to attack the witness's
credibility on cross-examination. 27 This prevents the jury from be-
ing misled into converting such a prior bad action into palpable
evidence of present wrongdoing.28 That prior bad acts should only
be used for impeachment purposes is, therefore, an especially im-
portant rule when the witness to be cross-examined is a criminal
defendant.29 If the defendant's prior bad acts are permissibly used
at will by the prosecution during the course of the defendant's
cross-examination, the jury may begin to believe that, due to the
defendant's prior bad acts, he is a person who possesses criminal
propensities, or that he has likely committed other crimes for
conduct-whether the witness is now telling the truth while testifying under oath-as
opposed to the witness' conduct in the past. Because such evidence relates to conduct
occurring in the presence of the fact-finder, demeanor during testimony enhances the
evidence's probative value.
(2) that the potential for prejudice from the fact-finder's improper use of character
impeachment evidence (for example, using such evidence as evidence of the defend-
ant's present culpability) will be less because the evidence is generally offered against
witnesses and not the accused.
Id.; see also CLEARY, supra note 3, § 40, at 53. "The character of a witness for truthfulness
or mendacity is relevant circumstantial evidence on the question of the truth of a particular
testimony of the witness." Id. "The theory underlying the use of evidence of character of
conduct for impeachment purposes is that a person who possesses certain inadequate char-
acter traits... is more prone than a person whose character, in these respects, is good, to
testify untruthfully." Id.; United States v. Melton, 739 F.2d 576, 579 (11th Cir. 1984). The
Melton court stated that if the defendant was able to convince individuals to trade expen-
sive cars for worthless gems, the trial judge could have concluded that the government
should be allowed to call five witnesses to counteract the effect of defendant's obviously
believable personality on the jury. Id.
27 See FED. R. EVID. 611(b). Rule 611(b) provides in pertinent part: "[E]vidence should be
limited to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the credibility
of the witness." Id.; see also RICE, supra note 21, at 696. The common law prohibits use of
evidence of an individual's character, such as with prior act testimony, to show witness
acted in conformity with that character. Id. An exception to this general rule is that such
evidence can be used to impeach an individual's credibility. Id. Specific instances of conduct
or misconduct may be used to support or attack a witness's credibility. Id.; United States v.
Byrd, 771 F.2d 215, 219 (7th Cir. 1985). The court did not agree with the defendant's argu-
ment that evidence of prior convictions used to attack the witness's credibility was prejudi-
cial. Id.; People v. Sorge, 301 N.Y.2d 198, 200, 93 N.E.2d 637, 638 (1950). Prior bad acts
have been described as immoral, vicious or criminal acts. Id.
28 See People v. Mayrant, 43 N.Y.2d 236, 239, 372 N.E.2d 1, 2, 401 N.Y.S.2d 165, 166
(1977). The policy underlying the belief that a person may not be convicted of one crime
because he committed another is "rooted in practical policy, justice and fairness." Id. (quot-
ing People v. Richardson, 222 N.Y. 103, 109-10 (1917)); People v. Zachowitz, 254 N.Y. 192,
198 (1930). Chief Justice Benjamin Cardozo stated:
There may be cogency in the argument that a quarrelsome defendant is more likely to
start a quarrel than one of a milder type, a man of more dangerous mode of life more
likely than a shy recluse. The law is not blind to this, but equally it is not blind to the
peril of the innocent if character is accepted as probative of crime.
Id.
29 See CLEARY, supra note 3, § 42, at 153. Impeachment by a prior conviction has the
strongest impact on the criminal-defendant witness. Id.
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which he has not been apprehended.30 This places the defendant
at a distinct disadvantage because the veil of blamelessness has
been removed from his character. 31
II. THE HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF IMPEACHMENT ON THE
BASIS OF PRIOR BAD ACTS
The extent to which a witness could be cross-examined to show
that he was unworthy of belief was generally unlimited under
early English and American common laws.3 2 Both permitted coun-
30 See id. If the criminal defendant was forced to reveal his prior convictions, there was a
danger that the jury would give such fact considerable weight, especially if the past convic-
tion was for a crime similar to the one for which he was currently on trial. Id.; see also 3
JACK B. WEINSTEIN, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE § 608, at 609-31 (1993). The criminal defendant
is often placed in a difficult dilemma because if he testifies, he may risk impeachment due
to his prior convictions. Id. On the other hand, if he decides not to testify, his silence may
induce the jury to determine guilt. Id.
In 1990, Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a) was amended in order to protect criminal de-
fendants who wished to testify by treating them differently than other witnesses. Id. at
609-42. When a criminal defendant is the witness, this rule required "a determination that
the 'probative value' of 'the conviction' outweighs its prejudicial effect to 'the accused.'" Id.
The conference determined that prejudicial effect to be weighed against the probative value
of the conviction is specifically the prejudicial effect to the defendant. See FED. R. EVID. 609.
The danger of prejudice to a witness other than the defendant, such as injury to the wit-
ness's reputation in his community was expressly rejected by the conference as an element
to be weighed in determining admissibility. Id.; United States v. Turner, 960 F.2d 461, 465
(5th Cir. 1992). The defendant was convicted on three counts of knowingly and intention-
ally causing a threatening communication to be delivered through the U.S. Postal Service.
Id. The court determined that the use of defendant's prior convictions for aggravated sex-
ual abuse, burglary, and possession of a deadly weapon was admissible because the proba-
tive value of the evidence outweighed any potential unfair prejudice. Id.
31 See Terre E. Foster, Rule 609(a) in the Civil Context: A Recommendation of Reform, 57
FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 6 (1988) (arguing for abolition of use of convictions for impeachment in
civil context); see also Joel Cohen, Impeachment of a Defendant Witness by Prior Convic-
tions, 6 CRIM. L. BULL. 26, 32-36 (1976) (discussing prejudicial effect of prior convictions
upon criminal defendants); Leslie Alan Glick, Impeachment by Prior Convictions: A Cri-
tique of 609 of the Proposed Rules of Evidence for U.S. District Courts, 6 CRIM. L. BULL. 330,
330 (1970) (considering lying as psychological phenomenon); Robert G. Lawson, Credibility
and Character: A Different Look at an Interminable Problem, 50 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 758,
758 (1975) (discussing problem of lack of knowledge regarding character of human beings
in determining testimonial credibility); Erwin N. Griswold, The Long View, 51 A.B.A. J.
1017, 1021 (1965) (standing for proposition that criminal defendants are at mercy of
prosecutorial officials).
32 See GRAHAM, supra note 5, at 560. Prior to the Federal Rules of Evidence, England
and approximately eleven states utilized the wide-open rule, which allowed the cross-exam-
iner to question the witness's credibility and any other subject whether or not it related to
the case at bar. Id. Approximately 39 states adopted the restrictive direct examination rule
which limited the cross-examination to the subject matter of the direct-examination and
the witness's credibility. Id.; JOHN H. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §§ 983-86
(Chadbourn rev. 1970). In the 18th century, exploitation of a witness's life and associations
was liberally permissible and performed with reckless abandon. Id. The general rule was
that "any question tending to discredit" could be asked and the judges usually did not inter-
fere with these lines of questioning. Id. This practice of allowing broad power to cross-
examine continued through the 19th century. Id.
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sel to probe into a witness's past associations and personal history
for the purpose of discrediting the witness's testimony. 3 Thus,
virtually all prior bad acts committed by the witness were "fair
game" for the opposition upon cross-examination.3 4 This view
echoed the principle that the jury should see the witness within
the context of the entirety of his life, so that they could choose
whether or not to give credence to his testimony.35 The only re-
strictions on the broad freedom to cross-examine were those im-
posed by the trial judge."
By the 1800s, it became well-settled that testimony, elicited for
impeachment purposes regarding the character of the witness,
was limited to general character and not particular facts regard-
33 See WlaMORE, supra note 32, § 983, at 842. Cross-examination to discredit a witness's
testimony was called "cross-examination to credit," and counsel was given wide latitude to
"cross-examine to credit." Id. (quoting Thomas Hardy's Trial, 24 How. St. Tr. 199, 719
(1794)). As a general rule, the only limitation on the extent of "cross-examination to credit"
was that the witness to be impeached was not to be tortured unnecessarily by a barrage of
questions. Id. After a lengthy cross-examination regarding past misdeeds including, but
not limited to, previous statements that he would guillotine the king and that he lived by
smuggling and cheating, the court stated:
[G]entlemen, I stated to you before, that this witness has given very important evi-
dence .... All they rely upon to shake his credit is what turns out upon his cross-
examination-the account he gives of himself .... Gentlemen, it is your province to
judge what degree of credit you think fit to give to this man's evidence.
Id. at 843.
34 See WIGMORE, supra note 32, § 922, at 726 (proposing all bad acts should be admissi-
ble to show general bad moral character and propensity toward lack of veracity); see also
People v. Sorge, 301 N.Y. 198, 200, 93 N.E.2d 637, 638 (1950) (court contemplated use of all
prior bad acts for impeachment purposes); infra note 39 and accompanying text (explaining
some crimes preclude witness from testifying altogether).
35 See Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (purpose of impeach-
ment rule was to gain information from defendant regarding past actions), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 1029 (1968); Anne F. Curtin, Limiting the Use of Prior Bad Acts and Conviction to
Impeach the Defendant-Witness, 45 ALB. L. REV. 1099, 1115-17 (1981). There are two views
under which evidence of prior bad acts may be used to impeach, namely, the traditional
view whereby there is almost a total admission of such evidence and the modern view
whereby admissibility of such evidence is determined by balancing defendant's interests.
Id.; Note, Evidence-Impeaching the Credibility of the Defendant-Witness, 41 BROOK. L.
REV. 665, 667 (1975) (stating purpose of credibility impeachment rule was to elicit back-
ground information from defendant from which jury may determine credibility).
36 See WIGMORE, supra note 32, § 983, at 848. "The extent to which cross-examination
will be permitted is no doubt, in a large measure, in the discretion of the trial court." Id.
The cross-examination was merciless; and it is impossible to read it without regretting
that the exigencies of modern trials may be thought to justify such, and wondering that
counsel cannot see that they are fraught with more danger to the accused than possible
benefit. Witnesses have rights as well as the accused; and, while the Courts allow an
investigation of the character of a witness through cross-examination, there is a broad
discretion lodged in the trial [c]ourt in such matters.
Id. (quoting People v. McArron, 79 N.W. 944, 956 (Mich. 1899) (Hooker, J.)); see also
CLEARY, supra note 3, § 41, at 139. In the United States, the danger of victimizing the
witness and unduly prejudicing parties has led most courts to recognize that cross-exami-
nation is under the discretionary control of the judge. Id.
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ing past actions. Although a witness was competent to testify
despite his character flaws, his testimony was readily impeacha-
ble with evidence of poor character. Further, testimony from
those with "infamous characters" was given no credit.38 Many
judges and scholars, however, saw no validity in the argument
that those exhibiting general bad moral character 9 were not wor-
thy of belief.40 To protect defendants from juries, judges were or-
dered to distinguish for the jury the differences between bad acts
in general and those that specifically showed the witness's propen-
sity to lie.41 Under modem common law, a distinction is made be-
37 See Zephaniah Swift, Digest of the Law of Evidence, in Civil and Criminal Cases and a
Treatise on Bills of Exchange, and Promissory Notes 110, 143 (reprinted 1972) (1810).
Though a witness may be competent to testify, yet his character may be so infamous
that his testimony is entitled to no credit. In consequence of this, a rule has been
adopted, to admit the party against whom a witness swears, to call other witnesses to
impeach his character; but he is confined, in his inquiries, to his general character in
respect of truth; and may not prove particular facts; for every many is supposed to be
able to support his general character; but not to answer particular charges, without
notice.
Id.
38 See CLEARY, supra note 3, § 42, at 55. "At common law the conviction of a person of
treason or any felony, or of a misdemeanor involving dishonesty or false statement (crimen
falsi), or the obstruction ofjustice, rendered the convicted person altogether incompetent as
a witness." Id. These were said to be "infamous crimes." Id. Today, the extreme nature of
this rule has been abandoned and reduced to one ground on which testimony of a witness
may be impeached. Id.
39 See WiGMORE, supra note 32, §§ 977-88, at 821-921. The general consensus by the
early 19th century was that character evidence for truth of its content was only admissible
whereas proof of bad acts continued to be allowed generally. Id. § 986, at 855-61. Specifi-
cally, Wigmore stated that "historically, the use of bad general character appears as origi-
nally allowable.... "Id. § 923, at 728-34. "But .... [b]y the first part of the 1800s, a compro-
mise had been reached; and . . . character for truth only was taken as the fundamental
requirement...." Id. at 728-29.
40 United States v. Hans, 738 F.2d 88, 94 (3d Cir. 1984). The Hans court held that a
conviction for knowingly transporting forged securities is a crimen falsi offense and there
was no abuse of discretion in permitting such evidence for purposes of impeachment, as
long as § 922, at 727. Wigmore noted:
1. that, as a matter of human nature, a bad general disposition does not necessarily or
commonly involve a lack of veracity, and that therefore the former is of little or no
bearing probatively;
2. that the estimate of an ordinary witness as to another's bad general character is apt
to be formed loosely from uncertain data and to rest in large part on personal prejudice
and on mere differences of opinion on points of belief or conduct-a chance of error
which is relatively small in the specific inquiry as to the other's notorious untruthful-
ness; and
3. that the incidental unpleasant features of the witness-box are largely increased
when the way is opened to this broad and loose method of abusing those who are called
as witnesses.
Id..
41 See CLEARY, supra note 3, § 42, at 130. Thus, certain crimes became known as "crimen
falsi." Id. Crimen falsi crimes were crimes involving dishonesty, false statements, or the
obstruction of justice and once proven, would render the witness incompetent to testify
before the court. Id.; BLAcK's LAw DIcTIoNARY, supra note 1, at 372. Crimen falsi is defined
as:
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tween character evidence used to prove that a person acted in con-
formity with that character and use of prior bad acts to impeach
credibility.4
2
III. THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
The majority of jurisdictions today have adopted rules of evi-
dence which mimic the Federal Rules of Evidence ("Rule").43
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, evidence of prior bad acts
are admissible for impeachment purposes, provided the criteria of
either Rule 608(b) or Rule 609(a) have been met.44
Rule 608(b) requires that the prior bad act called into question
be probative of the truthfulness or untruthfulness of the witness
to be impeached.45 A criminal conviction, based on the alleged
prior bad act, does not necessarily act as a threshold to the admis-
sibility of the act into evidence for the purpose of impeaching a
witness's character under Rule 608(b). 46 Rule 608(b) does, how-
ever, constrain the use of prior bad acts for which there is no crim-
inal conviction by prohibiting the cross-examiner from using ex-
trinsic evidence to prove the prior bad act.47 In other words, the
crimes in the nature of perjury or subornation of perjury, false statement, criminal
fraud, embezzlement, false pretense, or any other offense which involves some element
of deceitfulness, untruthfulness, or falsification bearing on witness' propensity to tes-
tify truthfully. The definition of "crimen falsi" at common law is: any crime which ren-
dered the perpetrator incompetent to be a witness, such as forgery, perjury, suborna-
tion of perjury and other crimes affecting the administration of justice.
Id.
42 See RiCE, supra note 21, § 6.02, at 696.
43 Salken, supra note 11, at 658; see also L. Kevin Wroth, The Federal Rules of Evidence
in the States: A Ten Year Perspective, 30 VILL. L. REV. 1315, 1318 (1985) (stating that 10
years after adoption of Federal Rules of Evidence, 30 states adopted Federal Rules of Evi-
dence or rules derived therefrom).
44 See supra notes 14-15 (discussing Rules §§ 608(b) and 609(a)).
45 See supra note 15 (discussing Rule 608(b)); see also United States v. Greer, 643 F.2d
280, 282 (5th Cir.) (defense counsel's inquiry of witness's reputation not limited to truthful-
ness and therefore improper), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 854 (1981).
46 FED. R. EVID. 608(b).
47 Id.; see also United States v. Agnes, 753 F.2d 293, 304 (3rd Cir. 1985) (holding district
court did not err by precluding expert testimony pertaining to dealings with extortion vic-
tim); United States v. Reed, 715 F.2d 870, 875 (5th Cir. 1983) (extrinsic evidence excluded
to prove misconduct that did not result in conviction); Carter v. Hewitt, 617 F.2d 961 (3d
Cir. 1980) (discussing Rule 608(b)'s prohibition on extrinsic evidence and effect of barring
cross-examiner from using questions to obtain admission of prior bad act by witness);
Herzog v. United States, 226 F.2d 561, 565 (9th Cir.) (witness denied difficulties with OPA
and evidence could not be introduced to show payment of attorney's fees in connection with
threatened OPA suit), affd, 235 F.2d 664 (1965); Hug v. United States, 329 F.2d 475, 483
(6th Cir.) (witness denied he had been fired for stealing and cross-examiner was not free to
bring in independent proof to show that answer was true), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 818 (1964);
United States v. Whiting, 311 F.2d 191, 196 (4th Cir. 1962) (witness may be questioned as
to past misconduct, even as to collateral matters in order to impeach credibility and inter-
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question is collateral and the cross-examiner must accept the wit-
ness's answer even if he has dispositive proof of the commission of
the bad act.4"
On the other hand, Rule 609(a) addresses prior bad acts for
which the witness to be impeached has been convicted.49 The prior
bad act for which the witness was convicted must either have been
one involving dishonesty, false statements, or for which a sentence
of death or imprisonment of greater than one year could have been
imposed. 0 Under Rule 609(a), extrinsic evidence regarding the
fact of the conviction is permitted.5
The rules appear explicit, however in operation it becomes ap-
parent that the slight variations in admissibility between Rule
608(b) and Rule 609(a) can lead to inconsistent results depending
upon judicial interpretation12 and discretion.5 3 This is so despite
the fact that the rules, particularly Rule 609(a), were hotly de-
bated in Congress, leading to legislative compromises and care-
rogator bound by answer), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 935 (1963); State v. Freeland, 340 S.E.2d
35, 37 (N.C. 1986) (reversible error to allow mother to show child's good character for truth-
fulness because child was able to distinguish reality from fantasy).
48 See People v. Pavao, 59 N.Y.2d 282, 288, 451 N.E.2d 216, 219, 64 N.Y.S.2d 458, 461
(1983). The New York rule in this regard is the same. Id. The cross-examiner is bound by
the witness's answer on collateral matters and therefore extrinsic documentary evidence
concerning collateral matters is not admissible solely for impeachment purposes. Id.; cf.
People v. Hudy, 73 N.Y.2d 40, 56, 535 N.E.2d 250, 259, 538 N.Y.S.2d 197, 207 (1988) (hold-
ing that extrinsic proof to show reason for fabrication never collateral and may not be ex-
cluded on that ground).
49 See supra note 14 (discussing Rule 609(a)).
50 See FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1)-(2). Traditionally, felonies were used to impeach a witness
without regard to the nature of the particular offense. Id. However, under subdivision (a),
for purposes of impeachment, crimes were divided into two categories. Id.
51 Id.
52 See Uviller, supra note 3, at 809. The author noted that the language of 609(a)(2),
"involv[ing] dishonesty and false statement," could be construed as meaning the manner in
which the particular crime was committed or as referring to the elements of the crime. Id.
By using the former construction, almost any crime could fall within the meaning if it was
committed in some way which entails a misrepresentation. Id.; see also CLEARY, supra note
3, § 40, at 54. It is difficult to determine exactly which acts fall under the gambit of truth-
fulness of character. Id. The nature of specific offenses properly included within the phrase
"dishonesty and false statement" has been subject to great debate. Id. § 42, at 56.
53 See supra notes 14-15. Both Rules 608 (b) and 609 (a) leave considerable discretion to
the trial judge to determine "whether the probative value of the bad acts to be admitted for
impeachment purposes outweighs the prejudicial effect to the accused". Id.; United States
v. Mahone, 537 F.2d 922, 929 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1025 (1976). When balancing
probative value against prejudicial effect, several factors should be considered: the im-
peachment value of the prior crime; how long ago the conviction occurred; the importance of
the defendant's testimony; how similar the past crime and the charged crime are; and how
central the issue of credibility is to the case. Id.; see also United States v. McIntosh, 426
F.2d 1231, 1233 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (narcotics conviction bears weight on issue of credibility);
United States v. Bailey, 425 F.2d 1236, 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (trial court not permitted to
exercise discretion on basis of abstract beliefs, but rather on individualized rulings).
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fully, and cautiously worded rules. 54
The logic of these two rules appears inconsistent. Under Rule
609(a), bad acts for which a sentence of death or imprisonment for
a term greater than one year, are admissible to impeach; whereas
under Rule 608(b), only those prior bad acts which are probative of
the truthfulness or untruthfulness of the witness to be impeached
are admissible.55 For example, a conviction for murder would be
admissible under Rule 609(a) because it would be a conviction for
greater than one year, conversely, such conviction would not be
admissible under Rule 608(b) because the crime did not involve
truthfulness or untruthfulness. The basis behind Rule 609(a), al-
lowing into evidence those bad acts for which a conviction has
been obtained, dates back to the common law.56 The tenet under-
lying the common-law rule was that a witness who had a criminal
record was assumed to possess a bad moral character which would
naturally lead him to disregard the oath he undertook and to lie
on the stand. 7
Despite the inherent problems with the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence,58 the fact that so many states have adopted them is testa-
54 See RICE, supra note 21, at 794 (stating Rule 609 was one of more hotly contested of
Federal Rules of Evidence); 1 S. SALTZBERG & M. MARTIN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
MANUAL 150 (5th ed. 1990). There was probably no single rule which caused as much con-
troversy as Rule 609. Id. The reason given for this controversy was the continuing support
for the rule that the trial judge balance probative worth against prejudicial effect. Id. In the
House of Representatives, however, the view was that a prior conviction should only be
introduced if the crime involved dishonesty or false statement. Id.
55 See supra notes 14-15 (discussing Rules 608(b) and 609(a)).
56 See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text (discussing history of common-law evi-
dence rules).
57 See RICE, supra note 21, § 6.02, at 696. The author noted:
[T]he cross-examiner could make these inquiries concerning a witness's prior convic-
tions regardless of whether the acts giving rise to the felony convictions had any rele-
vance to the witness's character trait for truth and veracity. Courts believed that
merely being convicted of such a serious offense reflected negatively on the witness's
willingness to disregard his oath.
Id.; GRAHAM, supra note 5, at 607. The author explained:
[E]mployment of a prior conviction to impeach a witness is premised upon the assump-
tion that a person with a criminal record has a bad general character, evidenced by his
willingness to disobey the law, and that his bad general character would lead him to
disregard his oath to testify truthfully. It is also asserted in support of using a prior
conviction to impeach "with much force that it would be misleading to permit the ac-
cused to appear as a witness of blameless life, and this argument has prevailed
widely."
Id. (quoting CLEARY, supra note 3, § 43, at 89).
58 See RICE, supra note 21 (comprehensive text regarding problems encountered under
Federal Rules of Evidence); Graham, supra note 4 (discussing problems under Federal
Rules of Evidence). One of the especially noteworthy problems encountered in the area of
impeachment of credibility of the criminal defendant, was the defendant's dilemma in de-
ciding whether or not to testify. See Mason Ladd, Credibility Tests-Current Trends, 89 U.
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ment to their credit. New York, one of the few states lacking codi-
fied rules of evidence, adheres to much broader rules of
admissibility of prior bad acts. 9 However, this broad application
appears to be changing.
IV. THE NEW YORK RULE
In People v. Sorge,60 the New York Court of Appeals held that
"[a] defendant, like any other witness, may be interrogated upon
cross-examination in regard to any specific vicious, criminal or im-
moral act of his life that has a bearing on his credibility."61 While
New York courts have continued to apply the Sorge rule, they
have moved slowly toward applying the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. The following three aspects of the Sorge rule have been
impacted by recent cases: the distinction between defendant and
nondefendant witnesses; the acts deemed to impact credibility;
and the time frame from which the witness's prior acts will be
used to impeach.
A. The Distinction Between Defendant and Non-Defendant
Witnesses62
The Sorge court made no distinction between defendant and
PA. L. REV. 166, 184 (1940). Particularly, the author explained:
A defendant in deciding whether he will take the witness stand and testify in his own
behalf must take into account not only the question of his innocence and the proof by
which he may establish it but also the dangers to which he is exposed by the evidence
which the prosecution will present at least ostensibly to discredit his testimony.
Id.
59 See People v. Sorge, 301 N.Y. 198, 198, 93 N.E.2d 637, 637 (1950).
60 301 N.Y. 198, 93 N.E.2d 637 (1950).
61 Id. at 200, 93 N.E.2d at 638. The court explained:
There can, of course, be no doubt as to the propriety of cross-examining a defendant
concerning the commission of other specific criminal or immoral acts. A defendant, like
any other witness, may be interrogated upon cross-examination in regard to any vi-
cious or criminal act of his life that has a bearing on his credibility as a witness.
Id.; see also People v. Dokes, 79 N.Y.2d 656, 661, 595 N.E.2d 836, 839, 584 N.Y.S.2d 761,
766 (1992) (allowing prosecution to cross-examine defendant about prior bad acts); People
v. Betts, 70 N.Y.2d 289, 293, 514 N.E.2d 865, 866, 520 N.Y.S.2d 370, 371 (1989) (holding
Sorge removed barrier, conditionally, to further interrogation of defendant as to specific
acts).
62 Sorge, 301 N.Y. at 198, 93 N.E.2d at 637. "A defendant like any other witness." Id.; see
also People v. Kass, 25 N.Y.2d 123, 126, 250 N.E. 2d 219, 221, 302 N.Y.S.2d 807, 809 (1969)
(inquiring into defendant's misappropriation of diamonds relevant to credibility, as long as,
prosecutor asked questions in good faith and had sufficient basis for asking same); People
v. Schwartzman, 24 N.Y.2d 241, 244, 247 N.E.2d 642, 644, 299 N.Y.S.2d 817, 820 (nature
and extent of cross-examination subject to sound discretion of trial judge), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 846 (1969); People v. Duffy, 36 N.Y.2d 258, 262, 326 N.E.2d 804, 806, 367 N.Y.S.2d
236, 239 (2d Dep't 1975) (by choosing to testify, defendant may be cross-examined
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non-defendant witnesses.63 More recently, however, it has been
recognized that defendants may be placed in a particularly diffi-
cult position when testifying as a witness. 4 In People v. Wilson,65
an order was sought to prohibit the prosecution from cross-exam-
ining defendant regarding prior bad acts and convictions.6 6 The
prosecutor opposed this motion on the grounds that the Sorge de-
cision permitted him to cross-examine the defendant regarding his
past immoral acts and convictions. 67 The New York City criminal
court stated that although the Sorge rule allowed interrogations of
this nature, "a trend ha[d] developed in recent years in the law to
examine this general principle in the light of the particular cir-
cumstances of each individual case."68
concerning any immoral, vicious or criminal acts bearing on credibility).
63 Sorge, 301 N.Y. at 198, 93 N.E.2d at 637 (language of rule itself and court's opinion
freely interchanged "defendant" and "witness" throughout).
64 See People v. McGee, 68 N.Y.2d 328, 332, 501 N.E.2d 576, 578, 508 N.Y.S.2d 927, 929(1986) (holding Sandoval rule does not apply to nondefendant witness); People v. Mayrant,
43 N.Y.2d 236, 239, 372 N.E.2d 1, 2, 401 N.Y.S.2d 165, 166 (1977) (defendant exercising
constitutional right to testify may be cross-examined in good faith concerning prior im-
moral, vicious or criminal conduct it if bears on credibility); People v. Dickman, 42 N.Y.2d
294, 297, 366 N.E.2d 843, 844, 397 N.Y.S.2d 754, 756 (1977) ("examination with respect to
crimes or conduct similar to that of which the defendant is presently charged may be highly
prejudicial"); see also People v. Ventimiglia, 52 N.Y.2d 350, 362, 420 N.E.2d 59, 63, 438
N.Y.S.2d 261, 265 (1981) (court should balance admissibility of evidence based on manner
discovered, relevance, probativeness, and necessity against prejudicial effect); People v. In-
nis, 98 A.D.2d 808, 809, 470 N.Y.S.2d 26, 28 (2d Dep't 1983) (defendant retains right to
object at trial to prejudicial cross-examination and if objection challenges inquiry into his
prior misconduct, he is entitled to ruling based upon same criteria as would have been
applied had issue been raised before trial); People v. Otero, 75 A.D.2d 168, 174, 428
N.Y.S.2d 956, 969 (2d Dep't 1980) (Sandoval merely establishes procedural guidelines and
identifies relevant criteria for issuance of ruling in advance of trial limiting scope of poten-
tial cross-examination of defendant who testifies on own behalf).65 75 Misc. 2d 720, 348 N.Y.S.2d 486 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Queens County 1973); see also
People v. Pavao, 59 N.Y.2d 282, 292, 451 N.E.2d 216, 221, 464 N.Y.S.2d 458, 463 (1983)
(within discretion of trial judge to decide whether probative worth of other crime evidence
on issue of defendant's credibility outweighs risk of unfair prejudice); cf People v. Bennett,
79 N.Y.2d 464, 468, 593 N.E.2d 279, 282, 583 N.Y.S.2d 825, 827 (1992) (court held cross-
examination on unrelated pending criminal charge, solely for purpose of impeaching de-
fendant's credibility, was impermissible).
66 See Wilson, 75 Misc. 2d at 721, 348 N.Y.S.2d at 489 (defendant sought order to repress
information regarding history of arrests for burglary, possession of dangerous drug, re-
sisting arrest, petit larceny, and attempted assault).
67 Id. at 722, 348 N.Y.S.2d at 489 (holding general rule that witness may be cross-ex-
amined with respect to any immoral, vicious or criminal act which may affect character and
credibility); People v. Duffy, 36 N.Y.2d 258, 262, 326 N.E.2d 804, 806, 367 N.Y.S.2d 236,
239 (2d Dep't 1975) (stating long-recognized New York rule that defendant may not only be
cross-examined regarding any criminal convictions, but also as to commission of any vi-
cious or criminal acts, so long as questions are asked in good faith).
68 See Wilson, 75 Misc.2d 722, 348 N.Y.S.2d at 489; People v. President, 47 A.D.2d 535,
535, 363 N.Y.S.2d 612, 613 (2d Dep't 1975) (holding scope of cross-examination left to dis-
cretion of trial judge); see also Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 480-81, 487-88(1948) (discussing trial court's responsibility in regulating introduction of evidence of ac-
cused's character).
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The Wilson court looked to federal law in Luck v. United
States.69 The court cited Luck for the proposition that judicial dis-
cretion was especially important in situations where the witness
was the defendant, because the trial judge could believe that it
would be more helpful for the jury to hear the defendant's story,
rather than the defendant not taking the stand out of fear of im-
peachment due to prior convictions.70 Although the Wilson court
did not grant the motion for a pre-trial hearing regarding the ad-
missibility of prior bad acts, it sanctioned the propriety of the mo-
tion in similar instances.7'
Finally, in the landmark decision of People v. Sandoval,72 de-
cided just one year after Wilson, the New York Court of Appeals
approved a pre-trial determination of the permissible scope of
cross-examinations regarding past criminal, vicious, and immoral
acts. 73 This rule, which has been become known as the "Sandoval
motion,"74 is the New York equivalent of the balancing approach
required under rule 609(a).75 Under Rule 609(a), the trial judge is
69 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
70 Id. at 768; see also Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 514 (1989) (admis-
sibility conditioned upon judicial balancing expressly provided in uniform rules and model
codes); People v. Schwartzman, 24 N.Y.2d 241, 244, 247 N.E.2d 642, 644, 299 N.Y.S.2d 817,
820 (stating nature and extent of cross-examination and inquiry into transactions to im-
peach defendant's credibility within range of trial court's discretion), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
846 (1969).
71 See People v. Wilson, 75 Misc. 2d 720, 722, 348 N.Y.S.2d 486, 469 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct.
Queens County 1973). Ordinarily, a hearing on notice to the People would be ordered before
arriving at a decision of this nature. Id. In this case, however, the information furnished to
the court by defense counsel and the People, was sufficient to enable the court to arrive at a
fair determination of the defendant's request without the necessity of a formal hearing. Id.
In a criticism of allowing pre-trial hearings in most cases, the Wilson court said:
[B]ased upon our experience, such a hearing should be granted only in those unique
factual situations where a defendant (1) can show a valid, disputed issue of law by
establishing that his prior convictions would violate a recognized constitutional right
or create substantial prejudice to him, and (2) where a defendant can clearly show a
pressing need for such a determination in advance of trial.
Id.; see also People v. Otero, 75 A.D.2d 168, 174, 428 N.Y.S.2d 956, 969 (2d Dep't 1980). The
procedure established in Sandoval required that, in order to obtain an advanced ruling,
limiting scope of cross-examination, the defendant must inform the court of prior convic-
tions and misconduct which might unfairly effect him as a witness. Id.; People v. Innis, 98
A.D.2d 808, 809, 470 N.Y.S.2d 26, 28 (2d Dep't 1983) (within court's discretion to make
advanced ruling concerning prosecutor's use of prior convictions).
72 34 N.Y.2d 371, 314 N.E.2d 413, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1974).
73 Id. at 375, 314 N.E.2d at 416, 357 N.Y.S 2d at 854. The Sandoval court explained:
[I]n most cases, as in this case, but not necessarily in all cases, a pretrial motion will be
preferable. Thereby, the defendant with definitive advance knowledge of the scope of
cross-examination as to prior conduct to which he will be subjected, can decide whether
to take the witness stand.
Id.
74 Id.
75 See supra note 14 (discussing Rule 609).
1993] PRIOR BAD ACTS
mandated to determine whether the probative value of admitting
the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect on the accused.76
Although the balancing approach is mandatory under Rule 609(a),
it is permissive in New York under Sandoval." The New York
Court of Appeals, in People v. Pollock,78 specifically stated that
Sandoval prescribed a procedural means by which the defendant
could obtain an advance ruling, but it did not mandate the appli-
cation of a particular balancing process.79
Such balancing was never required under the holding of
Sorge. ° Despite the clear affirmation by the New York Court of
Appeals in Pollock that Sandoval did not change the existing
law,8 1 the court in People v. Simpson,8 2 determined that in exer-
cising its discretion, the trial court was required to balance proba-
tive worth with the risk of unfair prejudice. 3 In New York, some
courts have determined that not weighing probative value with
prejudicial effect should constitute reversible error because the
trial judge did not properly exercise his discretion. 4
76 See id. The rule states in pertinent part: "[Elvidence that an accused has been con-
victed of such a crime shall be admitted if the court determines that the probative value of
admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused." Id.; see also FED. R.
EVID. 403. This rule generally requires a balancing for all relevant evidence:
[A]lithough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
Id.
77 See supra note 73 (discussing permissive use of Sandoval hearing).
78 50 N.Y.2d 547, 407 N.E.2d 472, 429 N.Y.S.2d 628 (1980).
79 Id.
80 See supra note 73.
81 See infra note 84 and accompanying text (discussing that Sandoval decision did not
change existing law according to New York Court of Appeals).
82 109 A.D.2d 461, 492 N.Y.S.2d 609 (1st Dep't 1985).
83 Id. at 464, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 613. "In exercising that discretion, the trial court is re-
quired to balance the probative worth.., against the risk of unfair prejudice to the defend-
ant." Id.
84 See People v. Pollock, 50 N.Y.2d 547, 550, 407 N.E.2d 472, 474, 429 N.Y.S.2d 628, 630
(1980) (Meyer, J., dissenting). Judge Meyer stated:
[O]n the Sandoval issue it is clear that the Trial Judge used the wrong criteria and
thus did not properly exercise his discretion in determining the extent of permissible
cross-examination .... [T]he thrust of Sandoval is that because a jury may be led by
such evidence to infer criminal propensity.., defendant is in effect denied his constitu-
tional right to be a witness in his own behalf unless he knows before he takes the stand
what evidence of prior crime he will face. Sandoval spells out the factors on which the
determination turns....
Id.; People v. Woods, 149 A.D.2d 550, 550, 539 N.Y.S.2d 1002, 1003 (2d Dep't 1989) (court
may properly weigh probative value of defendant's prior bad acts, as it relates to credibil-
ity, against potential prejudice); People v. Simpson, 109 A.D.2d 461, 472,492 N.Y.S.2d 609,
617 (1st Dep't 1985) (discretion of trial judge to determine extent to which defendant can be
cross-examined); People v. George, 54 A.D.2d 410,418, 389 N.Y.S.2d 94, 99 (1st Dep't 1976)
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In People v. Gottleib,85 the Appellate Division, First Depart-
ment, stated that the permissive balancing approach dictated in
Sorge was inconsistent with the balancing test as it had since de-
veloped. 8 The First Department, therefore, requires the trial
court to balance the probative worth of the specific criminal, vi-
cious, or immoral acts on the issue of a defendant's credibility,
against the risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant.8 7 The New
York Court of Appeals explained in People v. Betts,88 that based on
the privilege against self-incrimination, the defendant was enti-
tled to a pretrial ruling precluding cross-examination for credibil-
ity purposes of information regarding a pending unrelated crimi-
nal charge.8 9
However, the Betts court did not mandate the application of the
balancing approach used under Rule 609(a).9 0 This rule of re-
quired balancing emanated from People v. Duffy, 91 where the Ap-
pellate Division, Second Department, announced that such bal-
(Murphy, J., dissenting). Judge Murphy stated that it should be reversible error not to
grant a motion to determine the admissibility of prior bad acts, "[s]ince the trial court's
denial of the motions to preclude cross-examination regarding prior drug convictions may
have effectively denied defendants a fair trial . . ." Id.; see also People v. Travison, 59
A.D.2d 404, 408, 400 N.Y.S.2d 188, 190 (3d Dep't 1977) (holding court can reverse convic-
tion as matter of discretion in interest of justice where cross-examination deprives defend-
ant of fair trial), affd, 46 N.Y.2d 758, 386 N.E.2d 256, 413 N.Y.S.2d 648 (1978), cert. de-
nied, 441 U.S. 949 (1979); People v. Wilson, 75 Misc. 2d 720, 722, 348 N.Y.S.2d 486, 490
(Sup. Ct. Queens County 1973) (power of inquiry not unlimited and extent of such examina-
tion lies largely within discretion of trial judge).
85 130 A.D.2d 202, 517 N.Y.S.2d 978 (1st Dep't 1987).
86 Id. at 208, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 983.
87 Id. at 206, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 980; see also People v. Schwartzman, 24 N.Y.2d 241, 247,
247 N.E.2d 642, 646, 299 N.Y.S.2d 817, 823 (1969) (rules governing admissibility of evi-
dence of other crimes represent balance between probative value of such proof and danger
of prejudice presented to accused).
88 70 N.Y.2d 289, 514 N.E.2d 865, 520 N.Y.S.2d 370 (1987).
89 See id. at 291, 514 N.E.2d at 865, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 370. The Betts court stated:
[T]he applicable evidentiary rule is that a defendant is entitled to a pretrial ruling,
based on the assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination, precluding the prose-
cution from cross-examining for credibility purposes only as to pending unrelated crim-
inal charges if defendant takes the stand as a witness at the trial. We recognize that
the issue seemed to many to have been well settled in New York that a defendant
could, as a general rule, be cross-examined in these circumstances. While particular
circumstances not present in this case may permit appropriate cross-examination on
such an issue, careful analysis of the precedents affecting the specific evidentiary rule
manifest the correctness of precluding it here.
Id.; see also People v. Bennett, 79 N.Y.2d 464, 468, 593 N.E.2d 279, 282, 583 N.Y.S.2d 825,
827 (1992) (while per se rules are eschewed where defendant's misconduct is another pend-
ing criminal charge, more categorical approaches are appropriate because of constitutional
protection against self-incrimination).
90 Betts, 70 N.Y.2d at 291, 514 N.E.2d at 865, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 370.
91 44 A.D.2d 298, 354 N.Y.S.2d 672 (2d Dep't 1974), affd, 36 N.Y.2d 258, 326 N.E.2d 804,
367 N.Y.S.2d 236 (1975).
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ancing was required.92  Although that announcement was
qualified by a statement that the varying circumstances of each
case would depend upon ad hoc applications,9 3 and a footnote ex-
plaining that although this was a guideline, the nature of judicial
discretion precluded rigid standards,94 the foundation was estab-
lished to adopt mandatory balancing. The use of a uniform ap-
proach is furthered by New York's Proposed Rule of Evidence
608(b) which would adopt mandatory balancing.95
B. The Acts Bearing on Credibility96
The Sorge rule enunciated that a witness could be cross-ex-
amined for credibility purposes regarding a broad array of bad
acts as long as it affected his credibility as a witness. 97 Prior to
92 Duffy, 44 A.D.2d at 305, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 678 (stating trial court should determine
whether prejudicial effect outweighs probative value, and "[h]ence we today announce that
to be the applicable law"); see also People v. Dowdell, 88 A.D.2d 239, 243, 453 N.Y.S.2d 174,
177 (1st Dep't 1982). Not only is a defendant entitled to a Sandoval hearing, but should it
be determined in the hearing that questioning regarding certain bad acts is to be precluded
during the trial, any such subsequent questioning is reversible error. Id.
93 Duffy, 44 A.D.2d at 306 n.2, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 678 n.2.
94 Id. (quoting Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied., 390
U.S. 1029 (1968)). The Duffy court stated that according to Gordon:
We are well aware that these are not firm guidelines which can be applied readily...
the very nature of judicial exercise precludes rigid standards for it's exercise; we seek
to give some assistance to the trial judge, to whom we have assigned the extremely
difficult task of weighing and balancing these elusive concepts.
Id.
95 See NEW YORK PROPOSED CODE EVID. 608(b). The proposed rule states in pertinent
part:
[I]n a criminal case, specific instances of conduct bearing on the credibility of the ac-
cused offered by the prosecution are not admissible if the prejudicial effect of the evi-
dence, including the effect the evidence would have in deterring the accused from testi-
fying, outweighs the probative worth of the evidence on the accused's credibility.
Id.; People v. Vaughn, 175 A.D.2d 414, 415, 572 N.Y.S.2d 483, 485 (3d Dep't 1991) (discre-
tion requires "careful balancing of probative value and prejudicial effect . . . ."); People v.
Wilson, 75 Misc. 2d 720, 722, 348 N.Y.S.2d 486, 489 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1973) (hold-
ing power of inquiry lies largely within discretion of trial judge); see also Coursey v.
Broadhurst, 888 F.2d 338, 342 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding prejudice-weighing prerequisite to
admissibility of felony convictions applies only in criminal trials); People v. Hunter, 88
A.D.2d 321, 322, 453 N.Y.S.2d 212, 214 (2d Dep't 1982) (stating proposed code of evidence
for State of New York drastically limits what may be admitted for credibility purposes
when witness is defendant).
96 People v. Sorge, 301 N.Y. 198, 198, 93 N.E.2d 637, 637 (1950). "Any vicious, criminal
or immoral act ... that has a bearing on credibility." Id.
97 See id.at 200, 93 N.E.2d at 638; Wilson, 75 Misc. 2d at 723, 348 N.Y.S.2d at 491 (stat-
ing adversarial system exposes witness's life to scrutiny and jury entitled to consider all
relevant factors in determining credibility); see also People v. Dickman, 42 N.Y.2d 294, 297,
366 N.E.2d 843, 844, 397 N.Y.S.2d 754, 756 (1977) (defendant may be cross-examined, with
appropriate limiting instructions, with respect to crimes or conduct similar to that for
which defendant presently being tried); People v. Wright, 41 N.Y.2d 172, 175, 359 N.E.2d
696, 698, 391 N.Y.S.2d 101, 103 (1976) (proper to question defendant regarding drug addic-
tion and conviction for possession of hypodermic needle, since pertain to credibility).
284 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 9:265
Sorge, in People v. Montlake,9" the Appellate Division limited the
types of bad acts to those involving moral turpitude.9 9 Contrary to
the Court of Appeal's intention in Sorge, many courts continue to
follow this rule.' 0 Sorge, however, never required that the bad
acts involve moral turpitude. Instead, the Sorge court stated that
the jury's knowledge of previous bad acts would "cast light upon
the degree of turpitude involved and assist the jury in evaluating
the witness's credibility." 1 1
By continuing to equate "vicious, criminal or immoral acts" with
the term "moral turpitude" courts have attempted to limit the
scope of the Sorge rule. 102 In People v. Moore, 0 3 the Appellate Di-
vision, Second Department, used moral turpitude to determine
whether a previous act was admissible. The court held that the
defendant's previous act of vandalism "was not, under the circum-
stances, an act which evidenced some fair tendency to show moral
turpitude" and thus the bad act was not admissible. 104
Substitution of the term "moral turpitude" for "any vicious,
criminal, or immoral act" continues to cloud the application of the
Sorge rule since there are many definitions of moral turpitude.
10 5
Since most of these definitions require some graveness or vileness,
they are not as broad as the all inclusive language of Sorge.1°6 The
98 184 A.D. 578, 172 N.Y.S. 102 (1918).
99 Id. at 578, 172 N.Y.S. at 106 (holding unpaid rent not constitute moral turpitude to
warrant cross-examination).
100 See People v. Hunter, 88 A.D.2d 321, 322, 453 N.Y.S.2d 212, 214 (2d Dep't 1982)
(witness may be interrogated regarding any vicious, criminal or immoral act involving
moral turpitude); Seventh Ave. Deli. v. Manhattan Provision Co., 146 N.Y.S.2d 25, 29 (Sup.
Ct. Kings County 1955) (matters introduced for purpose of discrediting party must show
moral turpitude), affd, 1 A.D.2d 1037, 153 N.Y.S.2d 572 (2d Dep't 1956).
101 People v. Sorge, 301 N.Y. 198, 200, 93 N.E.2d 637, 640 (1950).
102 See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text (citing cases where evidence of vicious,
criminal or immoral acts are disqualified from evidence for impeachment purposes).
103 42 A.D.2d 268, 346 N.Y.S.2d 363 (2d Dep't 1973).
104 Id. at 273, 346 N.Y.S.2d at 369.
105 See BLAcKes LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 1008. Moral turpitude has been de-
fined as:
[T]he act of baseness, vileness, or the depravity in private and social duties which
many owes to his fellow man, or to society in general, contrary to accepted and custom-
ary rule of right and duty between man and man. Act or behavior that gravely violates
moral sentiment or accepted moral standards of community and is a morally culpable
quality held to be present in some criminal offenses as distinguished from others. The
quality of a crime involving grave infringement of the moral sentiment of the commu-
nity as distinguished from statutory mala prohibita.
Id.; see also Mishkin v. Roreck, 202 Misc. 2d 653, 656, 115 N.Y.S.2d 269, 272 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1952). Moral turpitude is "an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the
private or social duties which man owes to his fellow men or to society in general, contrary
to the accepted and customary rule or right and duty between man and man." Id.
106 See BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 1008 (stating various definitions of
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New York definition of moral turpitude excludes those crimes
which are merely statutory mala prohibita. °7 Crimes such as
gambling, failing to pay debts, depravation of a driver's license, or
vandalism have long been held not to involve moral turpitude. 08
More recently, crimes such as failure to pay rent and employment
in the pornographic industry have been similarly held not to in-
volve moral turpitude. 109 However, use of aliases has been allowed
to show moral turpitude. 110 Using the term "moral turpitude" for
"vicious, criminal, and immoral acts" has, therefore, effectively
narrowed the scope of crimes which may be introduced.
Although many courts define which bad acts may be introduced
by determining whether the act in question involves moral turpi-
tude, the Sorge rule permits those acts which are vicious, crimi-
nal, or involve immorality to be introduced."' The Sorge rule,
therefore, is a broader classification of crimes which are admissi-
ble. 1 12 Adoption of New York's Proposed Rules of Evidence would
eliminate this disparity, because they do not require courts to de-
termine whether an act involves moral turpitude. 11 3
C. The Time Frame from Which Acts May Be Used"14
The holding in Sorge contemplated the use for impeachment
purposes of almost any bad act of the witness's life." 5 There was
no specific preclusion for acts occurring a certain length of time in
moral turpitude). Id.
107 See BLACes LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 956. Mala prohibita crimes are acts or
omissions that are made criminal by statute, but are not criminal of themselves. Id.
108 See EDITH L. FISCH, FISCH ON NEW YORK EVIDENCE § 456, at 296 (2d ed. 1977). Acts
which have been held to not show moral turpitude are: gambling, card playing, betting on
horses; failure to pay debts; violating college rules; deprivation of a drivers license; and
vandalism. Id.
109 See id. The failure to pay rent or employment in the pornographic industry does not
establish moral turpitude. Id.
110 See id. (citing People v. Greer, 181 A.D.2d 422, 580 N.Y.S.2d 331 (1st Dep't 1992);
People v. Bost, 176 A.D.2d 1085, 575 N.Y.S.2d 392 (3d Dep't 1991)).
111 People v. Sorge, 301 N.Y. 198, 93 N.E.2d 637 (1950).
112 See People v. Batista, 113 A.D.2d 890, 891, 493 N.Y.S.2d 608, 610 (2d Dep't 1985)
(permitting cross-examination of witness with respect to any immoral, vicious or criminal
act which may reflect on his credibility); People v. Arrellano, 150 Misc. 2d 574, 580, 569
N.Y.S.2d 574, 578 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Kings County 1991) (holding witness may be im-
peached with any immoral, vicious or criminal act which show him to be untrustworthy,
even never convicted).
113 See supra note 95 (discussing New York Proposed Rule of Evidence 608(b)).
114 Sorge, 301 N.Y. at 200, 93 N.E.2d at 638. "[O]f his life." Id.
115 Id. (court did not qualify statement "of his life" with any time barrier); People v.
Brailsford, 106 A.D.2d 648, 650, 482 N.Y.S.2d 907, 908 (2d Dep't 1984) (questioning wit-
ness regarding any acts involving moral turpitude permissible).
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the past. 116 In contrast, the Federal Rules of Evidence preclude
evidence of prior convictions if they occurred more than ten years
ago, unless it can be shown that there is special probative value of
the conviction. 11 7 Even prior to the passage of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, some New York courts took special notice of the issue
regarding the passage of time and, additionally, the age of the wit-
ness when those bad acts were committed. 1 8
In Sandoval, the Court of Appeals noted that the passage of
time would affect the materiality of prior bad acts." 9 Similarly, in
People v. Wilson,'2 ° the Queens County court, Criminal Term, did
not allow a twenty-one-year-old narcotic conviction to be used to
impeach the defendant.' 2 1 More recently, courts, in cases decided
after adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, have held that the
passage of time is an important factor in admitting bad acts into
evidence. In People v. Ocasio, 22 the Court of Appeals held that it
was not reversible error to exclude from impeachment, evidence of
a thirty-two-year-old manslaughter conviction since it was "part of
a skein of convictions... cover[ing] too many years."123
The Proposed Rules of Evidence in New York would amend the
116 People v. Sorge, 301 N.Y. 198, 198, 93 N.E.2d 637, 637 (1950).
117 See FED. R. EvD. 609(b). The rule states in pertinent part:
[E]vidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of more than ten
years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or the release of the witness from the
confinement imposed for that conviction... unless the court determines that the pro-
bative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substan-
tially outweighs its prejudicial effect.
Id.
118 See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text (providing no time barrier used to
determine whether act would be admissible for impeachment purposes); see also People v.
Caviness, 38 N.Y.2d 227, 233, 342 N.E.2d 496, 501, 379 N.Y.S.2d 695, 701 (1975) (excluding
twenty year old gun conviction). But see People v. Mackey, 49 N.Y.2d 274, 282, 401 N.E.2d
398, 403,425 N.Y.S.2d 288, 292-93 (1980) (ten year old petit larceny and disorderly conduct
convictions admitted).
119 See People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 376, 314 N.E.2d 413, 417, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849,
855 (1974). The Sandoval court stated:
[E]vidence of prior specific criminal, vicious or immoral conduct should be admitted if
the nature of such conduct or the circumstances in which it occurred bear logically and
reasonably on the issue of credibility. Lapse of time, however, will affect the material-
ity if not the relevance of previous conduct.
Id.
120 75 Misc. 2d 720, 348 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1973).
121 Id. at 725, 348 N.Y.S.2d at 490 (discussing People v. Puco, 453 F.2d 539 (2d Cir.
1971)).
122 47 N.Y.2d 55, 389 N.E.2d 1101, 416 N.Y.S.2d 581 (1979).
123 Id. at 60, 389 N.E.2d at 1103, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 584; see also People v. Provenzano, 79
A.D.2d 811, 814, 435 N.Y.S.2d 369, 372 (3d Dep't 1980) (trial judge should use discretion in
instances where passage of time coupled with witness's conduct since occurrence of acts in
question would suggest injustice).
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Sorge rule in that the introduction of bad acts for impeachment
purposes would be prohibited if the act occurred at least fifteen
years prior. 124 Although the comment to the Proposed Rules noted
that it has always been the case that courts recognize that lapse of
time affects probative value,'2 5 the definitive time period proposed
was similar to the time period used by the Federal Rules of
Evidence. 126
CONCLUSION
Impeachment of a witness's credibility through the use of prior
bad acts continues to be permissible in New York. Since the rule
in New York is inconsistently applied, and continues to be
amended through case law, there is a need for a clear enunciation
of the current rule and uniform application. The Federal Rules of
Evidence and the New York Proposed Rules of Evidence appear
helpful in this regard. These rules would set guidelines for judges
to use in determining the admissibility of a bad act. More defini-
tive rules would, therefore, aid the courts in determining whether
a specific act is admissible, and thereby lead to more consistent
results rather than ad hoc decisions.
Lenore McKenna
124 See NEW YORK PROPOSED CODE OF EVID. 608(c). This rule would provide, in pertinent
part:
(1) General rule. Evidence of a specific act of conduct under this section is not admissi-
ble if a period of more than fifteen years, excluding any period of incarceration, has
elapsed since the date of the occurrence of the act, unless the court determines that the
probative worth of the specific act on the witness's credibility substantially outweighs
its prejudicial effect.
Id.
125 See NEW YORK PROPOSED CODE OF EVID. 608(c)(1) cmt. The comment to the proposed
rule provides:
[U]nder this section, conduct that occurred more than 15 years before the witness's
testimony in the instant case is subject to a special balancing test. That test requires
the court to be persuaded that the probative value of the evidence substantially out-
weighs its prejudicial effect. Under the present law there is no time limit, although
courts recognize that the older the act, the less its probative value.
Id.
126 FED. R. EVID. 609(b). The rule states, in pertinent part:
[E]vidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of more than ten
years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness from
the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date, unless the
court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the conviction
supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial
effect.
Id.

